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Gordon White and Kate Young
Five years ago a conference met at this Institute to
consider the immediate post-revolutionary experience
of Nicaraguan development. At that time we came to
several conclusions: first, that the development
strategies adopted by the Sandinista government had
several features which distinguished them from
orthodox forms of socialist development, notably the
commitment to a degree of economic and political
pluralism. Second, although there had been significant
progress in achieving more equal distribution and
meeting basic social needs, Nicaragua's development
performance was problematic in certain basic areas
[for a more detailed discussion see White and Young
1985]. Third, an already worrying economic situation
was being exacerbated by the escalation of the Contra
war and the hostility of the Reagan administration.
In November last year a workshop was convened to
review the situation four years on. It placed particular
emphasis on the way the war has impinged on
Nicaragua's ability to deal with its pressing economic
problems and implement its distinctive development
model. Most of the papers in this Bulletin were
presented at that workshop.' The last five years have
seen an initial intensification of the war accompanied
by considerable deterioration in the economy. Several
of the papers graphically demonstrate the direct and
indirect costs, human and material, of what Marchetti
calls a low-intensity war. But pressures have mounted
both within and without the country to bring about a
political solution. Among the pressures outside the
country, particularly significant have been, first,
mounting opposition to the Reagan administration's
policy in the United States both within Congress and
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the public at large, fuelled by revelations about the
illegal actions of certain members of the administration
in the Irangate Affair (as Leogrande's article
describes); and, second, the attempt by Central
American governments to establish a viable peace
process in the region through the Arias Plan.
Turning to internal pressures, we should first note that
while Nicaragua shares many of the usual problems of
small Third World countries, it faces - as other
countries attempting a radical developmental alter-
native along socialist lines also have - the added
burden of a counter-revolutionary war fostered by
external agents. The developmental implications are
serious since many aspects of such wars, whether the
military strategy of the insurgents or the supportive
economic pressures of their external backers, are
precisely targeted on discrediting the post-
revolutionary regime by undermining its development
effort (the Mozambican case is very comparable).
Such wars also pose the danger of a depressing cycle
whereby internal conflict and external hostility propel
the regime towards greater political authoritarianism
and economic centralisation.
As the articles in this Bulletin demonstrate, however,
the Nicaraguan case is interesting to the extent that
this has not taken place. In political terms, although
the initial Sandinista response was to manage the
challenges posed by the counter-revolution through
increasing control over political opposition (the most
obvious symbol of which was the closing of the
opposition paper, La Prensa), in recent years there has
been a marked reorientation toward a more flexible
political approach. This not only implies a willingness
to make political concessions within the context of the
Arias Plan, but also embodies more fundamental
changes: the reluctance to establish a vanguard-style
party, the granting of significant autonomy to the
Atlantic Coast, and allowing greater political partici-
pation of organisations representing the peasantry.
An important factor in these policy shifts has been the
need to strengthen the social base of the regime in the
face of tensions engendered by the Contras.
In economic terms, significant moves have been made
towards liberalisation in the urban industrial, rural
agricultural and foreign trade sectors, reflecting a
growing recognition on the part of planners and
politicians that the economic problems exacerbated or
created by the war could not be dealt with by a further
expansion of direct state controls. This recognition
has led, therefore, to a redefinition of the role of the
state in the economy and a search for macroeconomic
instruments capable of correcting the massive
disequilibria which afflict the country. Evans, for
example, describes the decision to give incentive
payments in dollars to capitalist cotton producers.
Utting points to the partial liberalisation in grain trade
in 1985/6 and the new role for state farms, which have
been charged with providing services to local private
and cooperative producers. Kaimowitz shows how the
Sandinistas have since 1986 adopted a more liberal
policy toward private agriculture and a more flexible
attitude to cooperative organisation. In overall terms,
FitzGerald describes these policies as a shift in the
relationship between state and market, whereby an
earlier strategy through which the state sector aimed
to absorb or marginalise other forms of ownership
(notably the capitalist and smallholder sectors), is
being replaced by a new planning model which
attempts to achieve the 'articulation' of these different
and potentially competitive sectors.
In spite of these policy changes, however, the
economic situation in Nicaragua remains parlous.
Clearly, since one of the major causes is the war, the
situation cannot be ameliorated nor can policy
remedies have their desired effect unless peace is
achieved. All the articles make this point emphatically.
The costs of the war and its accompanying pressures,
notably the US trade embargo, are serious indeed. But
even without these, Nicaragua's development prospects
are constrained by the unfavourable international
economic environment, as Goldin and Pizarro
demonstrate. At the same time, however, it is
recognised that all Nicaragua's development ills
cannot be attributed to external factors and the war
alone. Many of the articles recognise that to a
significant degree many of these problems are the
result of policy mistakes.
Paradoxically, the war has proved a stimulus for the
government both to recognise and rectify basic policy
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deficiencies. Irvin and Croes, for example, argue that
Nicaragua's investment strategy since 1979 has led to
an 'accumulation trap' which prevents the kind of
policy adjustment necessary to respond to the need to
put the economy on a war footing. Jenkins points out
that some of the basic problems in the textile industry
are the result of mistaken investment decisions and the
lack of a coherent industrial policy. Goldin and
Pizarro point to the lack of a clear conception of the
relationship between food crops and agro-export
crops and to deficiencies in policies affecting
agriculture such as pricing and exchange rate levels.
Utting attempts to characterise these policy deficiencies
in terms of three types of distortions: urban bias, state
sector bias, and favouring investment over con-
sumption. A different type of policy misjudgement,
which exacerbates longstanding ethnic and regional
tensions, is described by Smith in her article on the
Atlantic Coast.
Recent policy changes appear to be in the right
direction, and our optimism can be strengthened by
the improved political context for peace. But historical
experience suggests that peace not only solves but also
creates problems. Aspirations and tensions hitherto
muffled may well emerge in the post-settlement period
to make the government's task more complex.
Moreover, a restoration of the stability and dynamism
of the Nicaraguan economy depends on a range of
factors only partly within the control of the
Government. These involve difficulties jet managing
an increasingly mixed and disaggregated economy, the
fact that significant improvement depends not merely
on a return to more normal flows of development
finance but also on efforts to reconstitute the Central
American economy, and a more favourable turn in the
international economy as a whole.
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